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The Inefficient Common Law
Commentators on Anglo-American legal development have argued that
the common law is composed of economically efficient rules.1 Using for-
mal economic models,' these commentators have shown that common law
rules evolve toward efficiency.' This Note disputes that conclusion. It pro-
1. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 404 (2d ed. 1977) ("judge made rules tend to be
efficiency promoting"). Considerable research supports this proposition. See Bishop, Economic Loss in
Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1982) ("one important aim of such restrictions [on liability
for economic loss in tort] is to achieve economic efficiency"); Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and
the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of
Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REV. 69, 69 (1978) (common law principle of "compensat-
ing the aggrieved party for its entire expectation loss, without overcompensating it, is an economically
sound principle in that it facilitates the movement of goods and services to their highest value user");
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 33
(1978) (privilege of nondisclosure in contract law "promotes efficiency by encouraging the deliberate
search for socially useful information"); Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. &
ECON. 61 (1971) (economic model of efficient behavior by prosecutors and defendants empirically
valid); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851
(1981) (most recent statement of "positive economic theory of tort law," that the common law of
accidents "promote[s] efficient resource allocation"); Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samar-
itans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 128
(1977) ("the conditions under which law will intervene to encourage rescuers, and the method of the
intervention that will be chosen . . . are best explained as efforts-however unwitting-to bring
about efficient results"); Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administra-
tion, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) (many aspects of legal procedure and judicial administration
enhance efficiency); Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 416
(1977) ("courts in gratuitous-promise cases have reached results generally congruent with the pre-
scriptions of economic analysis"); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Con-
tract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (doctrine of impossibility in contract
law is generally consistent with economically efficient behavior); Priest, Breach and Remedy for the
Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91
HARV. L. REV. 960, 1001 (1978) ("[clourts have extended Code principles beyond the letter of the
Code in ways which minimize costs and [have] refused to adopt interpretations of the Code which
increased the costs of sales transactions"); Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90
YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) (common law principle of allocating "responsibilities between manufacturers
and different sets of consumers by standardized warranties is responsive to consumer preferences, and
establishes coherent economic incentives for manufacturers and consumers to optimize productive ser-
vices"). The evidence marshalled by these commentators supports the inference that portions of the
common law have at times been efficient. This is not inconsistent with the result of this Note. See
infra pp. 883-85.
2. In chronological order, the more significant papers are: Rubin, Why Is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the
Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); Cooter, Kornhauser & Lane, Liability Rules, Limited
Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1979); Landes & Posner, Adjudica-
tion as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve
the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolu-
tionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981).
3. The use of formal economic models is often associated with the University of Chicago. This
approach finds strongest expression in R. POSNER, supra note 1. See also Krier, Book Review, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 1664, 1693-97 (1974) (review of economic efficiency aspect of Posner's book).
Several analysts have used models to explain the evolution of the common law in terms of efficiency.
See Rubin, supra note 2, at 61 ("[t]he efficiency of the common law, to the extent that it exists, can be
explained by an evolutionary model"); Priest, supra note 2, at 66 ("My analysis provides a foundation
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poses a new economic model of the development of common law rules, one
that casts doubt on the ability of common law processes to achieve effi-
ciency, and hence it disputes the view that the common law is a source of
economically efficient legal rules. The Note argues that the inefficiencies
inherent in common law decisionmaking have contributed to the codifica-
tion4 of Anglo-American law, and urges a reevaluation of studies indicat-
ing that the common law is largely efficient.5
The analysis in this Note is framed in terms of the economic effects of
accident rules-how unforeseen losses are produced and allocated. Part I
of the Note describes the economic effects of different types of liability
rules, and the conditions under which a liability rule maximizes social
wealth.' Part II suggests a measure of the inefficiency of legal rules, em-
ploying a model that expands upon the traditional dichotomy between ef-
ficient and inefficient rules. Part III analyzes the determinants of legal
decision, criticizes previous models of the evolution of the common law,
and argues that the common law process will result in non-optimal ex-
penditures on accident prevention. Part IV discusses the implications of
this result for theories of Anglo-American legal development.
I. The Production and Allocation of Accident Prevention
From an economic perspective, an efficient liability rule is one that
maximizes social wealth. It does this by providing economic actors with an
incentive to undertake that amount of accident prevention activity that
minimizes the sum of accident avoidance and accident damage costs. By
outlining the conditions under which efficiency is obtained, this Part will
for the more general theory that common law decision-making facilitates over time the efficient alloca-
tion of resources."); Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 284 ("Our analysis suggests that this literature
has overstated the tendency of a common law system to produce efficient rules, although areas can be
identified where such a tendency can indeed be predicted on economic grounds."); Terrebonne, supra
note 2, at 405 ("The results of this evolutionary model support the thesis of selection favoring com-
mon law rules that promote economic efficiency."); Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 259 ("[T]he
economic theory of the common law. . . predicts that common law rules are efficient but has been
unable to discover the mechanism that generates these results."); c.. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its
Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1219 (1981) ("[Elvery day in every way the common law is
getting better and better.").
4. The word "codification" will be used loosely in this Note to refer to the "orgy of statute-
making" indulged in by American legislatures in the past 80 years. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977). A more precise term might be "statutorification," used in G. CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
5. The model used in this Note disputes the findings of previous studies and instead concludes
that the common law should not result in efficiency. Empirical research indicating that the common
law is efficient should be re-examined in light of this result. The scientific method normally provides
that theories should be modified to fit evidence. But in this case the evidence of efficiency is exception-
ally uncertain and prone to bias.
6. This analysis is equally applicable to intentional torts, and contract and property law. See R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 98-102 (1972) (analysis of legal rules allocating losses identical
for different areas of law); Rubin, supra note 2, at 52 (same).
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provide a foundation for analyzing the nature of inefficient rules.
A. Liability Rules, Accident Prevention Activity, and Social Wealth
Accident prevention is a good produced by two classes of economic ac-
tors-injurers and victims.8 In any economic activity,9 these two classes
seek to minimize their private costs by investing in accident prevention up
to the point at which the cost of one unit of additional prevention is equal
to the cost of one unit of additional damage.10 Since the production of
accident prevention involves significant externalities, 1 market failure re-
sults. The amount of accident prevention produced is less than the socially
optimal level. A manufacturer, for example, will only produce enough
care to balance at the margin the accident costs that he would have paid if
he had not produced the last unit of care, not those costs that he creates
but does not have to bear, such as the cost of environmental pollution. To
rectify this market failure, a public decision must be made on how much
accident prevention should be produced and how that production should
be allocated between injurers and victims. This choice is often imple-
7. Accident prevention is defined in this Note as the reduction in accident damages when injurer
and victim take levels of care I and V, where I is the amount of care exerted by the injurer and V is
the amount of care exerted by the victim. Care is considered to be composed of indivisible, homogene-
ous units. The benefit from accident prevention in any economic activity can be expressed as a func-
tion A(I,V). Note that the benefit from accident prevention, A(I,V), is equivalent to accident damage
costs at levels of care I and V. As I and V increase, accident damage costs decline, a benefit to society.
The cost of accident prevention is CII + CVV, where CI is the cost of a unit of injurer's care, and
CV is the cost of a unit of a victim's care. The assumptions concerning the functional forms of the cost
and benefit equations are discussed infra note 14.
In this Note, the terms "accident prevention" and "accident avoidance" are used interchangeably.
"Care" refers to I and V, the inputs to the production of accident prevention.
8. Obviously, other parties, such as insurance companies, pay accident costs in the common law
system. Their participation can be discounted, if not ignored, in this analysis for two reasons. First,
the influence of these institutions was small during the formative era of the Anglo-American common
law. Second, the effect of their involvement was to reduce risk to injurers and victims, not to reduce
the anticipated accident costs to parties. Only costs are relevant to this analysis. See infra note 13. The
analysis can be expanded to consider the wealth effects of liability rules on injurers and victims. See
infra p. 885.
9. For the purposes of this model, an economic activity is defined as any activity where losses are
allocated among potential cost bearers by a liability rule. An economic function such as railroading
may be composed of numerous economic activities. Cf Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 107 (1974) (mathematical analysis of cheapest cost avoider in single economic activity).
10. Implicitly assumed is that all parties are rational economic actors-they wish to minimize
private costs and maximize private wealth. This assumption leads to the construction of basic eco-
nomic principles such as the law of demand, opportunity cost, and substitutability of production in-
puts. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 1-5.
11. Externalities are costs created by an economic actor that are not borne by that actor. When
externalities are present, an actor who minimizes his private costs will not minimize social costs. The
presence of externalities has traditionally been a justification for public intervention in the market. See
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 30-32 (1971); H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS
203-07 (1978); ce Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1979) (arguing that
transaction costs, not externalities, are key to analysis of welfare maximization).
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mented through the use of liability rules.12
If society's goal were the maximization of social wealth"-the sum of
the wealth of all individuals in a society 1 4-then the production and allo-
cation of accident prevention would be governed by two principles. First,
the cost of the last unit of accident avoidance produced by either party
should equal the benefit of the last unit of accident damage prevented.11
12. Accident prevention is called a "public good," that is, a good whose benefits accrue to others
than those who produce it. If those who enjoy the benefits of a public good without paying for it can
be excluded from it, or charged for it, the external benefit can be internalized. This process of inter-
nalization is accomplished through liability rules.
Put another way, liability rules seek to internalize the benefits of accident prevention by regulating
the production of care for the public good. In the same way that an efficient producer of private goods
produces until the marginal cost of the goods equals the marginal benefit (revenue), society seeks to
duplicate this behavior for public goods by producing the social wealth-maximizing level of the public
good. On the economic analysis of public goods, see L. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF
COLLECTIVE GOODS (1969); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
13. The efficiency literature has been concerned with the minimization of the damage costs of
accidents and accident prevention (that is, the maximization of social wealth). See, e.g., W. BAXTER,
PEOPLE OR PENGUINS (1974) (cost-benefit analysis of pollution policies); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS 26-27 (student ed. 1970) (referring to goal of primary accident cost reduction). But see
Roberts & Stewart, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1644 (1975) (Baxter's analysis ignores non-
monetizable costs and distributional concerns). A normative argument for wealth maximization is
found in Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
An alternative to wealth maximization would be to maximize the parties' utility through appropri-
ate liability rules. See, e.g., Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. ECON.
REV. 22 (1957) (pioneering explication of utility maximization); Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vi-
carious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168 (1981) (analyzing utility-maximizing
vicarious liability rule). A review of the assumptions of wealth and utility maximization in terms of
Pareto-optimal behavior is found in Coleman, Book Review, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1982) (review-
ing R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1982)).
14. The maximization of social wealth (or the minimization of the costs of accidents) requires the
identification of the optimal amount of injurer's care I* and victim's care V*. This determination
follows essentially a two-stage process. Society first finds the efficient level of accident prevention,
denoted A*(I,V). See infra note 15. Second, society decides how most cheaply to produce that level.
See infra note 18.
This two-stage process is formally equivalent to minimizing the complete social cost function in an
economic activity. Thus, the task, for any single economic activity, is to minimize
Cs = C I + CvV + A(IV)
over I and V, where Cs is the social costs of accidents at a level of care I by the injurer and V by the
victim; CII and CVV are the costs of prevention; and A(I,V) is the damage costs of accidents.
This function is equivalent to satisfying simultaneously the equations
C, - AI(IV)
CV = AV(I,V)
where AI(I,V) is the marginal product of I, and AV(I,V) is the marginal product of V. These equa-
tions identify the optimal levels of care for injurer and victim as the point at which the benefit from a
marginal unit of accident prevention is equal to the cost of the inputs of care for each party. See
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324-26 (1973).
Production of accident prevention that satisfies these equations yields the efficient level of care I*
for the injurer and V* for the victim. The assumptions underlying this type of production function are
that A(I,V) is continuous and twice differentiable in I and V; the marginal cost of increased parties'
care is positive, that is, C1 , CV > 0; marginal accident damage costs are non-negative and non-
decreasing, that is, A(I,V) > 0; AI(I,V), AV(I,V) > 0; d 2A(IV)/dI' < 0; and d A(IV)/dV < 0;
and the marginal substitutability of inputs is declining, that is, dA'(I,V)/dIdV < 0. Id. at 324 n.3.
15. Given that the efficient level of accident prevention is denoted A*(I,V), see supra note 14, then
under this condition, society is required to produce A*(IV) in prevention. Since I and V, the injurer's
and victim's levels of care can be varied in such a way as to keep A*(IV) constant, this condition
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This principle is best explained in terms of the formal components of total
accident costs: accident prevention costs and accident damage costs. These
two costs are inversely related."8 Accident costs are minimized by spending
on accident prevention up to the point at which the marginal benefit of
avoidance equals the marginal cost of accident damages.
17
Second, the allocation of the production of accident prevention between
injurers and victims should be structured so that the reduction in accident
costs due to the last dollar of care expended by one party is equal to the
reduction in accident costs due to the last dollar of care expended by the
other." This allocation of the burden of preventing accidents will mini-
mize production costs.
A liability rule that simultaneously satisfies these two conditions maxi-
mizes social wealth. 9 From this result, two conclusions can be drawn: A
identifies a production isoquant-a function that specifies all values of I and V that produce a fixed
amount of output. The exact values of I and V that generate the optimal production isoquant,
A*(I,V), depend on the marginal technical rate of substitution of I and V. See J. HENDERSON & R.
QUANDT, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 42-54 (1958) (theory of multi-factor production).
16. Accident damage costs decrease as accident prevention costs rise. This is a consequence of the
positive marginal products of inputs I and V.
Other systems of categorizing accident costs have been identified. Guido Calabresi bases his analysis
on three separate types of accident costs. G. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 26-31. Primary costs to
Calabresi are accident and avoidance costs. Secondary costs are associated with administration of the
liability system. Tertiary costs are associated with wealth effects of the distribution of societal income.
Given the complexity of these variables, a formal mathematical efficiency analysis based on them
would be extremely difficult. Diamond, supra note 9, has attempted such an analysis, but the implica-
tions of his results are unclear.
17. Stopping production of accident prevention before the efficient point leads to the occurrence of
some accidents that could be avoided at less than their social cost. Producing accident prevention
beyond this point avoids some accidents at more than their cost. Neither outcome is socially efficient.
It is a general principle of economics that balancing marginal costs and benefits leads to efficiency.
This result assumes that all relevant costs, including transaction and information costs, are included in
the social cost function.
18. Since the marginal cost of substituting production inputs declines with output, efficient pro-
duction of accident prevention requires determining the combination of inputs that sets the relative
prices of the production of accident prevention by injurer and victim equal to the relative sub-
stitutability of inputs. See J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, supra note 15, at 42-54.
This condition puts a constraint on the values of I and V such that
AI(I,V) / CI = AV(IV) / CV
must hold. This equation gives the scale expansion path for producing accident prevention-the opti-
mal combination of I and V for every level of output. This condition is achieved when the slope of the
budget constraint, CI/Cv, equals the slope of the production isoquant, AI(I,V)/Av(I,V). This condi-
tion prescribes the cheapest combination of production inputs I and V given a desired level of accident
prevention. In combination with the condition that minimizes the social cost function, see supra note
14, this equation determines a unique combination of care by injurer and victim, (I*,V*), that mini-
mizes the social cost function. Id.
19. Much of the preceding analysis was developed by John Prather Brown. Brown, supra note
14. Brown begins by showing that parties' private costs are minimized by a rule setting a negligence
standard at the social optimum for that party (I* or V*). Brown's analysis assumed that accident costs
are fixed and that the care exercised by the parties has an effect only on the probability and not the
severity of an accident. The Brown analysis allowed the cost of an accident, but not the number of
accidents, to decrease with care. Thus Brown's framework does not provide for the "occurrence'
effect. See infra p. 877; see also Blume & Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 405 (1982) (expansion of Brown's model to standards of care which may change over
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rule may be non-wealth-maximizing if it either leads to too great or too
little production of accident prevention by the parties, or if it misallocates
the burden of production between injurers and victims.2"
B. Types of Liability Rules and Social Wealth
Liability rules of varying degrees of efficiency have developed in the
Anglo-American legal system. The efficiency of each type of rule is a con-
sequence of the effect of the rule on the production of accident prevention
and the allocation of accident costs.
1. Pure Comparative Fault
A rule of pure comparative fault imposes liability for accident costs on
parties in proportion to their causal responsibility. This rule optimally
allocates the burden of producing accident prevention by making the in-
jurer or victim liable for the costs he creates. The rule thus internalizes'all
costs; a 'rational economi& actor who minimizes private costs will also min-
imize social cost." l This rule also produces the optimal amount of accident
prevention since all costs of accidents are taken into account by a party.22
Absolute comparative fault is rare in law,23 but it offers guidelines for
efficiency in allocating accident liability.
time). The present model allows all accident costs (costs per accident and number of accidents) to vary
with the parties' care.
20. In the first case the injurer and victim do not produce the optimal amount of accident preven-
tion A*(IV); necessarily either I : * or V : V*. This inefficiency loss is due to the presence of
some accidents which could have been avoided at less than their damage cost.
In the second case, the injurer and victim produce non-optimal individual amounts of care, I *
and V V*, although the amount of accident prevention is optimized at A*(I,V) = A(I*,V*). The
efficient amount of prevention is produced, but at non-optimal cost.
Usually the inefficiency loss in any activity will be due to both non-optimal division of the produc-
tion of prevention and production of a sub-optimal level of prevention.
21. See Brown, supra note 14, at 337-40. Brown analyzes pure comparative fault under the name
of comparative negligence and concludes that it is inefficient. His analysis is faulty because he assumes
that parties are equally liable for accident damage costs. In pure comparative fault, the liability of a
party is proportional to the costs caused by that party. Determining such a fine division of causation is
admittedly difficult in practice.
22. Cf Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 863
(1980) (examines case where one party, the injurer, internalizes all costs).
23. Arkansas and Mississippi have both implemented a rule of pure comparative fault in negli-
gence actions. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-5
(1972); Twyner, A Survey and Analysis of Comparative Fault in Mississippi, 52 MISS. L.J. 563
(1982). Admiralty imposes the comparative fault rule for actions of personal injury and collisions
between ships. See The Woodrop-Sims, 2 Dod. 83, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (1815) (origin of rule on
collisions in Great Britain); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890) (adoption of rule for personal injury
in United States); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (adoption of rule for
collisions in United States). The most extensive application of comparative fault in admiralty, how-
ever, has come through statutory enactment. See Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5,
ch. 57, § 1 (comparative fault applied in collision of two or more ships); Death on the High Seas Act
§ 2, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) (comparative fault applied to death actions by seamen or their personal
representatives against employers); Merchant Marine (Jones) Act § 8, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (same
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2. Negligence Standards
Under a negligence rule, liability of an injurer or victim for accident
damage costs is predicated on the amount of care he took compared to a
pre-designated level.24 Since the private cost to an injurer or a victim will
not usually be equal to the social cost he creates (a negligent injurer may
bear no costs in some liability systems, for example), it is not obvious that
this type of rule minimizes social cost.25
John Prather Brown has shown that the application of a negligence
for personal injury or death); c. Employers' Liability Act (FELA) § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976) (com-
parative fault applied to personal injury or death actions by employees of common carriers); Mole &
Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence (pt. 1), 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 339-59 (1932); id. at
359-66 (comparing FELA with Jones Act).
Many states have a hybrid form of negligence and comparative fault. A common system is to appor-
tion liability on the basis of comparative fault up to the point where the victim is 50% at fault, after
which recovery by the victim is barred. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon
Supp. 1982). A review of hybrid "comparative negligence" systems is found in Special Project, Texas
Tort Law in Transition, 57 TEX. L. REV. 381 (1979). It is significant that, despite this being the most
efficient of liability rules, absolute comparative fault has usually been implemented by statute, never
by court decision. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 (4th ed. 1971); see also
infra pp. 885-86 (rise of statutory law response to inefficient common law).
24. The usual negligence rule is that liability falls on the victim unless the injurer is negligent and
the victim is not. However, many variations are possible. The doctrines of assumption of risk and last
clear chance, for instance, can be subsumed into the negligence and contributory negligence standards.
Each doctrine changes slightly the level of care required of a party. See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, §
66 (last clear chance); id. § 68 (assumption of risk).
There is an elegant symmetry between various types of negligence rules.
Rule The victim The injurer
is liable is liable
Strict liability in no cases in all cases.
No liability in all cases in no cases.
Negligence if injurer is not negligent if injurer is
negligent.
Pure contributory if victim is negligent if victim is not
negligence negligent.
Negligence with if injurer is not negligent if injurer is
contributory or victim is negligent negligent and victim
negligence is not negligent.
Negligence with if victim is negligent and if victim is not
dual contributory injurer is not negligent negligent or injurer
negligence is negligent.
A more involved explanation of these rules, including a graphical display of their properties, is found
in Brown, supra note 14, at 327-31. Strict liability is the inverse of no liability; the standards of care
for the victim and injurer are switched. The same is true for negligence versus pure contributory
negligence, and negligence with contributory negligence versus negligence with dual contributory
negligence.
25. The case for the efficiency of using negligence rules to allocate accident liability is made in
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (negligence rules economically effi-
cient); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973) (strict liability rule gener-
ally less efficient than negligence rule); see also Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation, 5
BELL J. ECON. 366 (1974) (mathematical analysis of negligence-contributory negligence liability sys-
tem). Posner later abandoned this position. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 264 (apparently
accepting Calabresi's strict liability standard as efficient).
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standard to the injurer, the victim, or both, can result in optimal produc-
tion of accident prevention in a static economic activity. 6 This result holds
if the levels of care required are set at the negligence standard advocated
by Judge Learned Hand. The Learned Hand rule designates a party as
negligent if the marginal benefit to society of his taking additional care is
greater than the marginal cost to society of that care.27 Private cost under
such a rule is minimized at the same level of care as social cost.2 8
3. Strict Liability
Some liability rules impose the costs of accidents on either the injurer or
victim regardless of his level of care.29 One party is liable no matter how
careful he is. In the presence of transaction costs, 0 parties minimizing
their private costs under this rule will generally fail to produce accident
prevention at the optimal level: those liable will produce too much, and
those not liable will produce too little.31 An efficient liability rule will
almost always require both victims and injurers to produce accident pre-
vention since the first unit of one party's care will generally be of more
value than some later unit of the other's care. 2 Thus, even if a strict
liability rule results in the optimal amount of accident prevention, it will
not efficiently divide production between injurer and victim. Nevertheless,
some commentators have wrongly recommended strict liability on effi-
26. See Brown, supra note 14, at 340-43. Brown's analysis of a static economic activity ignores
the entry and exit of economic actors. See infra note 28.
27. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.); see
also Brown, supra note 14, at 331-35 (analysis of various interpretations of Learned Hand rule).
28. Mitchell Polinsky expanded on Brown's work by taking into account the dynamics of the
market. If the entry or exit of producers of accident prevention from an economic activity is consid-
ered, Polinsky showed that the Learned Hand negligence rule is inefficient and that Brown's analysis
resulted in too little accident avoidance. Polinsky showed that efficiency could be achieved by a rule of
strict liability that would impose on the injurer those costs caused by him (actually a modified rule of
pure comparative fault). Alternatively, argued Polinsky, the level of care required by the negligence
standard could be increased so that the parties would expend more on prevention. See Polinsky, supra
note 22.
29. Some commentators have argued that strict liability was the general rule in the infancy of
accident law. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part I: The Influence of the Environment, 64 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1961), reprinted in L. GREEN2, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 59 (1965);
W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 74. But see Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-
Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) (American tort law evolved prima-
rily in terms of negligence doctrines, and was influenced less by English strict liability notions than by
early ideas of fault). Products liability law is the primary source of current strict liability law. Thirty-
nine states have adopted some form of strict product liability similar to that found in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
16A[3] (1982) (review of states adopting strict liability either by statute or court decision).
30. Without transaction costs, parties will negotiate between themselves to produce the optimal
amount of accident prevention. See infra note 37.
31. See Brown, supra note 14, at 326-27, 338.
32. This is because of the declining marginal rate of substitution of injurer's and victim's care in
producing accident prevention. It is generally cheaper to produce a good with two inputs than with
one. See J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, supra note 15, at 44-47.
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ciency grounds."3
An example might make comparison of different types of liability rules
clearer. In nineteenth-century England, railroad tracks often ran near
open fields; sparks from trains sometimes caused fires. 4 In evaluating this
situation, society determined that a certain level of accident damage from
fire was optimal. Assume for the moment that costs of transacting between
field owners and railroads are prohibitive, and that the field owner has a
comparative advantage at taking care. The railroad alone could achieve
this socially desired level of accident damage costs by taking a certain
amount of care, say at a cost of $30. The field owner alone could attain
this same level of damage costs by taking a certain amount of care less
cheaply than the railroad, say at a cost of $40. Probably some combina-
tion of both victim's care and injurer's care would be cheaper than either
alone, say at $20."5 This is the efficient division of inputs for the produc-
tion of accident prevention.3" It can be attained only if both parties have
an incentive to take care. If the assumption of prohibitive transaction costs
is relaxed, the parties will contract to allocate the burden of production
33. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055,
1060-67 (1972); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980). Calabresi
claims to be minimizing the sum of accident prevention costs and damage costs by placing liability on
the "best cost avoider." See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra, at 1057; see also G. CALABRESI, supra note
13, at 174-75. Calabresi also claims that a "cheapest cost avoider" strict liability rule minimizes the
sum of the three types of costs he considers. See supra note 13.
Calabresi has argued that placing liability on the cheapest cost avoider is best given the potential
errors involved in assessing fault, the presence of transaction costs, and the ability of parties to shift
liability by bargaining. Using this Note's terminology, Calabresi's argument is equivalent to introduc-
ing a presumption into tort law that a single party is the cheapest accident prevention producer. This
condition is not likely to be efficient, since most activities, to be efficient, require care by both parties.
The starting point should impose liability on both parties.
Calabresi has usually advocated a rule of strict liability that would impose liability on one
party-the victim or the injurer. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656,
656 (1975). Other commentators have also assumed that an economically efficient strict liability rule
would impose costs on only one of the parties. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 264.
In a departure from this idea, Calabresi has also advocated splitting strict liability for accident
damages between victim and injurer in a systematic manner based on the activity involved. See G.
CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 134-40. This is a better liability scheme, since almost all economic
activities will require care from both injurers and victims to be efficient. However, as with negligence
standards, Calabresi's rule will still be inefficient if the division of liability were not in accordance
with the actors' production functions. In only a few cases would an efficient division be made and
costs minimized.
The possibility also exists that Calabresi's solution is efficient given the presence of secondary and
tertiary accident costs, but this is not demonstrated in his analysis, and is not intuitively obvious. See
Diamond, supra note 9.
34. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (analysis of
placing liability for train-caused fires on railroad, landowner); R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 34-39
(review of Coase's analysis).
35. These numbers are consistent with declining marginal technical rate of substitution of inputs
for producing accident prevention. See supra note 18.
36. This example controls for the amount of care produced by the parties, and hence for accident
damages, in order to make the point about the marginal substitutability of production inputs. In an
actual example, parties would adjust the amount of care produced depending on their liability.
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between themselves in the least expensive manner. Even with lower trans-
action costs, the result that an efficient rule will usually require both par-
ties to produce accident prevention still holds.3"
II. The Recklessness of Common Law Rules
Inefficient liability rules may result in too much or too little production
of accident prevention. Inefficiency can be measured along a continuum of
recklessness and analyzed based on the costs of accident prevention and
accident damage created. This measure of inefficiency is vital to an analy-
sis of the way inefficient common law changes over time.
A. Inefficient Rules
For a given type of accident, a liability rule has generally arisen allocat-
ing the accident loss between injurer and victim. If the rule fails to mini-
mize the total accident costs of the activity, it is inefficient.38 Society may
increase its wealth by substituting an efficient rule in its place.39 Ineffi-
cient rules can create a social wealth loss either by inducing production of
a non-optimal amount of prevention, or by prompting production of opti-
mal prevention but misallocating that production between the injurer and
victim. This Note classifies rules as non-reckless, efficient, or reckless.
Non-reckless rules require too much care, resulting in too much accident
prevention and sub-optimal accident damages; 40 reckless rules require too
37. Coase showed that the parties will allocate the production of accident prevention between one
another efficiently regardless of the initial allocation of liability if transaction costs are zero. See
Coase, supra note 34. Thus the marginal conditions that identify I* and V*, see supra note 14, would
be attained.
38. In the common law, a liability rule usually prescribes a standard of care for the victim and a
standard of care for the injurer. For most activities, the loss falls on the victim unless the victim
exceeds the amount of care prescribed, and the injurer does not. This is the rule of negligence with
contributory negligence. The first American case under this rule is Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6
Cush.) 292 (1850) (award to plaintiff barred by his own negligence). This rule has been exhaustively
discussed. For an economic approach, see R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 123-24; Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra note 33, at 1056-59.
The classification of particular liability rules according to economic efficiency is still in its infancy.
The most extensive attempt at classification so far is found in R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 25-191.
39. The economic goal of wealth maximization assumes that society is better off as aggregate
wealth (goods and services for which people will pay) increases, regardless of how that wealth is
distributed. To the extent other goals besides wealth maximization are important to society, the impli-
cations of this Note are altered.
40. An example of a typical non-reckless common law rule and the judiciary's response to it is
provided by the early rule governing railroad crossings and automobiles. In Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), Justice Holmes established the common law rule that automobile
drivers must "stop, look, and listen" at railroad crossings to avoid liability for accidents. If a driver
failed to meet this standard of care, he could not recover for accidental loss if he were hit by a train.
In Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), a driver was confronted with a switch track, a main
track, and then two more switch tracks in his direction of travel. The driver stopped at the first
switch, but proceeded without stopping thereafter, and was hit by a train. The issue before the Court,
therefore, was whether the rule should be that a driver must stop (and perhaps get out and reconnoi-
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little care, resulting in insufficient accident prevention and excessive acci-
dent damages.41 These two types of inefficiency have not always been ap-
preciated in the literature.42 Indeed, the conclusion of many scholars that
efficient rules dominate judicial decisionmaking is largely a product of the
failure to distinguish between reckless and non-reckless inefficient rules.43
In Part III, the critical importance of the two types of inefficiency for the
development of the common law will be demonstrated."
ter) at each track, or whether he could simply look and listen.
Justice Cardozo, author of the Pokora opinion, rejected the earlier decision that stopping and inves-
tigating were usually necessary. The rationale of this reversal was that reconnoitering was uncommon,
inconvenient, and not very useful. In economic terms, the Court was analyzing whether the Goodman
rule was inefficiently non-reckless. It was possible that the excessive inconvenience of stopping at all
tracks was not worth the decrease in the discounted cost of crossing accidents. In fact, Justice Car-
dozo's ruling was simply a roundabout way of saying that the marginal cost of stopping was greater
than the marginal benefit of preventing accidents.
Justice Cardozo was apparently not altogether satisfied with the concept of the judiciary's sanction-
ing a certain number of accidents at railway crossings, even if this was necessary given the practicali-
ties of rail travel. Thus, he also hit upon a safety justification for his decision. It could be, wrote
Cardozo, that stopping and investigating is itself dangerous: "Where was Pokora to leave his truck
after getting out to reconnoitre? If he was to leave it on the switch, there was the possibility that the
box cars would be shunted down upon him before he could regain his seat." 292 U.S. at 105. While
this eventuality cannot be ruled out, it is highly unlikely, and it does not change the net result of a
"stop, look, and listen" rule, which is drastically to curtail railroad accidents. The few accidents that
Cardozo postulated would be outweighed by a decrease in accidents because of drivers' enhanced
awareness of oncoming trains.
This opinion, with its strained analysis of accident costs, can thus be read as an early recognition of
the implicit economic logic of accident law as applied to a non-reckless rule.
41. An example of a reckless rule appears in Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 49 N.E 1010
(1898). In this case, plaintiff Lorenzo fell into a coal hole situated next to a house, and sued the
leaseholder of the land. The trial court refused to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, and Lorenzo
appealed. Oliver Wendell Holmes, then on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, sustained
the appeal, and held that the plaintiff was presumed to know the dangers of coal loading despite her
total unfamiliarity with the practice. Id. at 601, 49 N.E. at 1011.
Although framed in terms of an analysis of "duty of care," Holmes' rationale for his decision seems
to be based on a rough cost-benefit calculation. The "dangers" created by loading coal are only "tem-
porary," and warning the public of the hole would be burdensome. Id.
This case illustrates the difficulties associated with making estimates of the efficiency of legal rules.
A warning by coal hole users could prevent more accident damages than it would cost, but this is not
certain, and the question is ultimately resolvable only on an empirical level. Holmes' reasoning-a
rough economic analysis performed in terms of formal legal concepts-is typical of that of judges
confronted by liability rules in novel circumstances.
42. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 263-75 (inefficient rule defined as one that does
not place liability on cheapest cost avoider); Priest, supra note 2, at 65-66 (inefficient rule defined as
one that does not minimize social costs); Rubin, supra note 2, at 52-53 (same). Nor has any previous
model contemplated that inefficient rules may impose a continuum of losses on parties.
43. Priest, for example, argues that inefficient rules will be litigated and overturned more often
than efficient rules, and hence will disappear from the common law. Priest, supra note 2, at 67. He
errs in assuming that both reckless and non-reckless rules will be litigated more often than efficient
rules; actually only non-reckless rules will be less litigated than their efficient counterparts. He also
errs in assuming that an overturned inefficient rule is necessarily replaced by an efficient standard.
The analysis in this Note makes more realistic assumptions about inefficiency and litigation. See infra
pp. 877-81.
44. The placement of liability rules along a continuum of recklessness is important in determining
how different types of rules are affected by the mechanism of legal precedent and litigation. See infra
pp. 877-81.
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B. The Measure of Inefficiency and Recklessness
An efficient rule maximizes social wealth by minimizing costs to society.
In Figure 1, the marginal cost of accident prevention,45 the marginal cost
of accident damages,"' and the total social cost47 curves are presented for
one party subject to a hypothetical common law rule. For purposes of
explication, the care taken by this party is allowed to vary while the care
taken by the other party in the activity is fixed at the optimal level.4 The
lowest point on the total social cost curve, Point A, locates the optimal
marginal units of care society should require of the participant in this
activity. Point A' indicates the corresponding total social cost at this point.
A reckless rule (indicated at r) would require too little accident avoid-
ance-the marginal cost of accident prevention would be at B, marginal
cost of accident prevention at C, and total social cost at D. The efficiency
loss would be measured by the vertical distance between A' and D. A
non-reckless rule (indicated at r2) would require too much accident avoid-
ance-the marginal costs of accident prevention would be at E, marginal
costs of accident prevention at F, and total social cost at G. Again the
inefficiency loss would be the vertical distance between A' and G. The
inefficiency of these rules may be gauged by their distance from the
optimum.
49
A convenient way to measure inefficiency at any level of prevention is to
compute a rule's "recklessness," defined as the ratio of actual accident
damages to accident damages at the optimum.50 The most reckless rule
45. The marginal cost of accident prevention is denoted CI for the injurer and CV for the victim.
46. The marginal benefit of prevented accidents is denoted AI(I,V) for the injurer and AV(IV)
for the victim.
47. Total social cost, denoted Cs, is equal to CI + CvV + A(I,V).
48. Thus the curves in Figure 1 trace the production of accident prevention, assuming one party is
behaving optimally and the other party varies his care-taking behavior. The actual determination of
the optimum levels of care for both parties is discussed supra note 14.
49. Coase's Theorem posits that in the absence of transaction costs, a market for legal liability
will develop which will make all rules efficient. See Coase, supra note 34, at 8. This Note assumes
that there are transaction costs in the real world, and therefore there are inefficient rules which pro-
duce non-wealth-maximizing allocations of liability. Cf. Brown, supra note 14, at 343-47 (judges
acting with limited information likely to encourage non-optimal behavior by injurers and victims);
Priest, supra note 2, at 65 (assuming positive real world transaction costs).
This Note assumes that where an area of law is governed by an inefficient liability rule, injurers
and victims behave inefficiently (that is, they do not minimize social costs) rather than bargaining
among themselves to reach the social optimum. Coase's Theorem suggests that this assumption of
inefficient behavior is invalid. However, parties may behave in a socially inefficient manner for several
reasons. First, the simple existence of inefficient accident rules that are obeyed by actors implies that
this is the case. See example given supra note 40. Second, in a world of transaction costs, bargaining
among actors to reach an efficient solution cannot be presumed. Third, in a world of limited informa-
tion, courts will have difficulty accurately locating the efficient level of care, and even efficiency-
minded courts could misjudge the optimum level of accident prevention required of parties. See
Brown, supra note 14, at 343-46 (where courts' information on marginal costs and benefits limited,
liability rules do not generate efficient equilibrium between injurer and victim).
50. Recklessness (r) is the ratio of accident damages to optimal accident damages under a given













possible in an activity requires no care on the part of the injurer or victim.
Recklessness at this point is designated r°.Recklessness at the socially effi-
cient level of accident prevention is 1. Infinitely more care can be ex-
pended on accident prevention as recklessness approaches zero. At some
point, however, it becomes rational for an injurer or victim to ignore the
extremely non-reckless rule and produce accident prevention at the effi-
cient standard of care. At this point, H on Figure 1, the recklessness of
rule that is, r - A(IV) / A(I*,V*).
For a reckless rule, r > 1; for a non-reckless rule, r < 1. Reference will also be made to the mean
recklessness of the common law ps a whole. See app. (on file with Yale Law Journal). An efficient
rule, of course, has recklessness of I (r=l).
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the rule equals rc.Si Any liability rule will thus result in a measure of
recklessness between r0 and rC.
52
III. The Development of Reckless Common Law: Litigation and
Precedent
This Part of the Note presents a formal model of the manner in which
litigation 53 and precedent 4 affect liability rules of varying degrees of eco-
nomic efficiency. 55 The model predicts that reckless liability rules will
gradually tend to dominate the common law, at the expense of non-reck-
less or efficient rules.5 6 The result requires only that rules be rankable in
51. The point at which a party relying on a non-reckless rule will disobey and behave at the
efficient level is where the prevention costs of an accident equal the optimum social cost. For the
injurer, this is where CII = fI* + A(I*,V*), and for the victim, this is where CvV = C V* +
A(I*,V*). The recklessness of a rule at these levels of care is A[I* + A(I*,V*)/CI, V* + A(1*,V*)/
Cv]/C s. A liability rule, however, never becomes this non-reckless. As soon as one party's prevention
costs equal total private costs (accident prevention expenditures and accident damage costs) at the
optimum level of prevention, he will ignore the rule, and produce accident prevention at the optimum.
The level of recklessness rc is located where one party first ceases following a non-reckless rule. This
is the minimum recklessness of a rule. The level of recklessness r° is located where no accident pre-
vention is produced.
To give an example of the limits of non-reckless behavior, it would be cheaper for a railway to
violate, at some point, an extremely high negligence standard (and thus accept liability for accidents),
rather than expend extravagant sums on prevention to remain above the standard.
52. A full proof would require examining each party's cost curves under a liability system of
negligence with contributory negligence. Given that the victim is expending care at the standard estab-
lished, the costs of accidents for the injurer are minimized at the negligence standard for the injurer
(call it In). With a non-reckless standard of negligence, an injurer is always negligent from 0 to I
n
(assuming the victim is behaving non-negligently), and is non-negligent from In onwards, thus bear-
ing only prevention costs. For any standard of care greater than In, it is cheaper for the injurer to
expend care only at In, and accept the full cost of accidents (damage and prevention), rather than to
accept only prevention costs at levels of care greater than In . This is the result for any combination of
reckless, efficient, and non-reckless victims and injurers, under any system of liability incorporating
negligence standards.
53. For the purposes of this Note, litigation refers to rulemaking at both the trial and appellate
levels. rf. R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 419-23 (most common law made at appellate level).
54. This Note will use "precedent" or "precedent stock" to denote that body of judicial decisions
supporting a particular rule of liability with respect to an accident-producing activity. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 2, at 264.
55. The models most in the tradition of this Note are found in Rubin, supra note 2; Priest, supra
note 2; Landes & Posner, supra note 2; and Terrebonne, supra note 2. Rubin and Priest initially
argued that a systematic mechanism existed to generate efficient common law. Goodman and Landes
& Posner found that in some situations efficiency could not be obtained. Terrebonne confirmed this.
None of these models considered the assumptions made in this Note that departures from efficiency
may be in either a reckless or non-reckless direction, and none of them generate precedent as a func-
tion of the degree of recklessness.
More generally, previous models have made over-simplified assumptions and invalid inferences
about judicial decisionmaking. This Note modifies or relaxes many of the assumptions of these models
to present a more accurate model of the evolution of efficiency in the common law. Other assumptions
are retained. For a discussion of the utility of even unrealistic assumptions, see M. FRIEDMAN, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
56. All previous models have reached the result that the common law will develop toward eco-
nomic efficiency. The Terrebonne, Goodman, and Cooter & Kornhauser analyses have qualified this
result by showing that the common law will reach an equilibrium of efficient and inefficient rules
with efficient rules predominating.
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terms of efficiency.5"
The process underlying this model can be summarized in three points.
First, more reckless rules are more likely to be litigated. Second, rules
litigated more often are more likely to develop precedent favorable to their
replication. Third, rules with a large favorable precedent stock "squeeze
out" less favored rules. It should be stressed at the outset that this model
purports to explain no more than one important facet of the common law.
Obviously, other considerations besides economic efficiency are involved in
a complete analysis of legal rulemaking. 8
A. Reckless Rules and Litigation
As the recklessness of liability rules increases, so do the amount of acci-
dent damages and the litigation associated with damage costs. The rela-
This model can be grouped into the broad category of economic theories that rely on "invisible
hand" mechanisms to analyze systemic behavior. This is because this model makes no assumptions
about the individual predilections toward efficiency of judges or disputants, but relies on the "invisible
hand" of litigation to explain change in the common law. "Invisible hand" mechanisms explain the
structure of systems studied in terms of systematic patterns of development, regardless of the desires of
individual actors. See generally Terrebonne, supra note 2, at 398-400 & n.4 (comparison of evolution-
ary and economic assumptions about human behavior).
Other economic models of the common law have hypothesized a trend toward efficiency based on
judicial attitudes favorable to efficiency. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 320-29 (judges decide cases
in conformance with community standards of wealth-maximization); Clark, The Interdisciplinary
Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241-42 (1981) (actors in the judicial process seek long
term cost-minimizing legal rules). But see R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 434-41 (reliance on invisible
hand explanation of development of common law); Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship:
A Comment on Clark and Posner, 90 YALE L.J. 1284 (1981) (critique of Clark's approach and
defense of invisible hand mechanisms). Non-evolutionary theories that incorporate judges' attitudes
toward economic efficiency can be analyzed in terms of the model proposed in this Note. See infra
note 86.
57. For an analysis in terms of Markov chains of the relationship between liability rules ordered
in terms of efficiency (or any orderable value), see Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 2. They find that
with a constant probability of a court's transforming rules of a certain degree of efficiency into rules of
efficiency one degree lesser or greater, a stable equilibrium will obtain with a mixture of efficient and
inefficient rules. The analysis is limited by their unrealistic assumption about how courts revise rules
in light of precedent.
58. The economic theory of the common law has been widely criticized for ignoring important
factors shaping legal decisionmaking. See Clark, supra note 56 (critique of literature on efficiency of
common law for failure to generate testable hypotheses); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1979) (criticizing implied ethical assumption in
literature and arguing that evidence is lacking that efficiency is primary value influencing common
law development); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980) (criticizing im-
practicality of pursuing efficiency as social goal); Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution, and Jus-
tice, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 799 (criticizing literature on basis of distributional consequences of efficiency-
based adjudication).
George Priest wrote a pioneering article on the theory of generating efficient rules from litigation.
Priest, supra note 2. But he recanted that piece in 1979 and contended that "it is impossible to devise
a coherent substantive theory of decision-making that can explain all common law decisions. An im-
plication of this showing is the improbability of the claim that all, or even most, common law rules are
efficient in their various applications." Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 399, 400 (1979); c Priest, supra note 2, at 66 ("common law decision-making facilitates over
time the efficient allocation of resources").
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tionship between recklessness of rules and accident damages is established
by definition, since the more reckless a rule is, the less accident avoidance
activity it requires, and the more accident damages it causes.59 Two fac-
tors relate the recklessness of rules with the degree of litigation of rules.
The first factor can be called the occurrence effect: As a rule becomes
more reckless, it results in more accidents. Thus, the occurrence effect will
lead to greater litigation of reckless rules than of non-reckless rules since
more accidents occur to be litigated. Previous analyses of common law
development have ignored the occurrence effect.60
Second, more reckless rules may result in more severe accidents-the
severity effect. Accidents under a reckless rule are on the average more
expensive.61 The sierity effect will also lead to increased litigation, al-
though the process is less direct. In general, it can be shown that the
probability of litigation is proportional to the gain to the parties from
litigating: the sum of their current and future stakes in a dispute, less
their expenses.62 Current stakes simply consist of accident damages, and
these increase as the recklessness of the liability rule increases. 63 Future
59. As accident damages costs, A(I,V), increase, recklessness (defined as A(IV)/A(I*,V*)) also
increases. See supra note 50.
60. The occurrence effect is intuitive and easily derived, but has so far been ignored in the litera-
ture in favor of the severity effect. Cf. Priest, supra note 2, at 67 (inefficient rules cause "more
accidents and more severe accidents," but implication of more accidents not addressed).
61. Either the occurrence effect or the severity effect or both hold as a rule increases in reckless-
ness. In general, reckless rules result in both more accidents and more severe accidents, although it is
possible to hypothesize rules that have only an occurrence or a severity effect. A common law rule that
places full liability for railroad crossing accidents on automobile drivers is likely to be reckless-there
is some amount of care, such as reducing speed, that trains could take at a lower marginal cost than
car drivers. Imposing liability on auto drivers would likely cause more accidents (the occurrence ef-
fect), and more severe accidents (the severity effect) than if trains were held to a standard of care as
well.
62. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 263-67 (considering current and future stakes); Priest,
supra note 2, at 73 (considering solely current stakes); Rubin, supra note 2, at 53-56 (considering
solely future stakes). If the total gain to the injurer is GI, and the total gain to the victim is GV, then
their joint gain from litigating is GI + GV. If this term is positive, they will go to court; if it is
negative, there is a shared incentive to settle. For example, if the injurer expects to win $5, and the
victim expects to lose $10, then G, + GV = $5 + (-$10) = -$5. The parties can gain from settling
if the victim gives the injurer any sum between $5 and $10.
63. Current stakes for the injurer are GI = pi(x) - e, where p, is the injurer's estimate of his
chances of prevailing in litigation, e, is the injurer's litigation expenses, and X is the damages from
the accident (current stakes). Similarly, the victim's gain is GV = pv(X) - eV. In this model, the
probability assigned by the injurer or the victim of prevailing at trial (or on appeal) is subjective, that
is, the probability of the case outcome can be assessed differently by injurer and victim. Landes &
Posner's model, supra note 2, at 263, assumed that the probability of prevailing is objective, that is,
p = PI = pV. Priest's model, on the other hand, assumed subjective estimates of the likelihood of
success. Priest, supra note 2, at 68. The present model subsumes the possibility of equal estimates by
parties (the objective approach), and also provides for the likelihood that estimates will differ.
Litigation expenses of the parties, el and eV, are assumed to be exogenous (predetermined) in this
model. This is consistent with Rubin and Priest, but Landes & Posner considered the possibility that
litigation expenditures increase as stakes increase. Rubin, supra note 2, at 52; Priest, supra note 2, at
67-68; Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 263, 278-80. They argued that this increases the amount of
litigation at any level of efficiency, since parties have greater expenses to recover, as well as current
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stakes are the expected returns of parties from establishing favorable
precedents, and these are greater the more nearly efficient a rule is.64 The
present analysis assumes future stakes are symmetric between parties.
The implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Part IV.
For most litigation, current stakes dominate;65 parties are more inter-
ested in the immediate benefits of trial than in the ultimate effect of their
dispute on the law. Hence, the reckless rule is tried more often since it
causes greater current accident damages. 6 If parties are risk-averse, the
correlation between stakes and litigation is blunted somewhat.6 7 The re-
sult of the combined occurrence and severity effects is a strong direct link
between the recklessness of a common law rules and the amount of litiga-
tion.68 The greater the recklessness of a common law rule, the more litiga-
and future stakes. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 278-80; see also Denzau, Litigation Ex-
penditures as Private Determinants of Judicial Decisions: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1979).
Cooter & Kornhauser also considered litigation expenditures to be determined by game-playing be-
havior of parties. Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 140. They concluded that this would result
in the entrenchment of inefficient rules. In terms of the present model, making litigation expenditures
exogenous would speed the trend to recklessness since litigation would increase, as in the Landes &
Posner model.
64. The best analysis of future stakes is found in Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 263-67.
65. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 113-14 (1974) (most parties in litigation not concerned with estab-
lishment of rules for similar future litigation). Empirical support for the proposition that higher cur-
rent stakes increase the likelihood of litigation is found in H. ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 222
(1970); MEDICAL MAL-PRACTICE-REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM. ON MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE app. at 13 (1973).
66. Let h(r) be a continuous function from r' to rc measuring the aggregate amount of litigation
produced by common law rules at any level of recklessness r. It would seem that h(r) could have any
form so long as dh(r)/dr > 0, that is, more reckless rules are litigated more often than less reckless
rules. In this analysis, a simple linear relation between litigation and precedent is posited: h(r) =
mr+c. The slope of this function is m, where m > 0, with the constraint that mrC+c > 0. The
properties of h(r) are considered in an appendix (on file with Yale Law Journal).
67. If parties are risk averse, litigation will not increase proportionately to current stakes, but will
increase at a decreasing rate as parties settle high-stake disputes. Hence, d'h(r)/dr2 < 0. The as-
sumption of risk averseness goes outside the model in that utility, rather than cost, governs parties'
behavior. See generally Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973)
(analysis of risk in legal conflicts).
68. Consider the set of activities where losses are governed by a common law liability rule. Each
of these rules will tend to produce a certain number of accidents in a period. The number of accidents
any rule will produce is a function of the efficiency of the rule and the nature of the activity. If one
controls for the nature of the activity, then as rules increase in recklessness, the number of accidents
increases. This model assumes that the type of activity is independent of the efficiency of the rule.
That is, over all rules, the number of accidents occurring at a certain level of recklessness is solely a
function of the care expended by the parties. That assumption follows in turn from the assumption
that there is a random mix of types of activities at any level of recklessness. For instance, at level of
recklessness rc, there are rules governing railroad crossing accidents and products liability, just as
there are at every other level of recklessness. Hence, the effect of the type of activity on the number of
accidents occurring at a certain level of recklessness falls out of the analysis.
Formally, this assumption is equivalent to showing that cov[h(r), z(r)] = 0, where h(r) is the
function measuring the number of accidents produced by rules due to the recklessness of the rules, and




B. Litigation and Precedent
The litigation of rules supported by precedents is the driving force of
common law evolution. At any time t-+1, the precedents from the previ-
ous litigation period t are applied by trial and appellate courts. Each time
a court construes a precedent, that precedent is either upheld, or over-
turned and revised.10 Recall that litigation of rules increases with reckless-
ness. Reckless rules are litigated and either upheld or overturned more
often than efficient rules, and much more often than non-reckless rules.
The stock of precedents, at time t-+1 consists of precedents upheld in the
previous period and precedents overturned in the previous period which
have been revised to new standards at time t+ 1.71 In addition, unlitigated
precedents from time t remain in force at time t + 1, although, due to their
age, they exert a diminished degree of influence on decisionmaking.
7 1
Thus the distribution of rules in terms of recklessness in any period is
the sum of three components: (1) the distribution of depreciated, unliti-
gated precedents from the immediately preceding period;73 (2) the distri-
69. A caveat on contract law is in order. Parties will often contract in advance of an accident to
determine the allocation of accident costs. If contract provisions are drafted in terms of typical liability
rules, this behavior increases the gain to parties from litigation, since contracting will only take place
where it is cheaper than allocating costs by way of accident rules. Contracting thus makes parties
wealthier. This increases future stakes because parties will have an incentive to litigate to establish
contract law as well as accident law. Increasing the gain from litigation will result in more litigation
of rules and a faster movement toward reckless common law. Formally, assuming contractual relations
implies that dh(r)/dr is greater by an increment due to enhanced wealth.
If contract terms allocate costs without reference to typical liability standards, a floor is set on the
possible inefficiency of liability rules, since parties will contract around rules that create a loss greater
than the transaction cost of contracting. Formally, the range [r0 , rc] is diminished. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 2, at 261-62.
70. This model assumes that the probability that a rule is overturned, denoted as a, is constant
with respect to the amount of accident prevention required by the rules. A tendency of courts to
uphold a rule as a function of its recklessness is a form of judicial bias discussed infra note 86.
71. The simplest assumption is that revised rules are randomly distributed over the interval [r&,
rc] or are distributed in proportion to a previous distribution fx(r). See app. (on file with Yale Law
Journal). Any other assumption implies that a court recognizes a standard of efficiency and is biased
for or against reckless rules. This possibility is considered infra note 86.
72. This is the first model of the evolution of the common law to analyze the implications of
depreciated precedents, decisions that have lost value as precedents because of their age. Priest's model
did not include a mechanism for precedents; in his model, decision is random. See Priest, supra note 2,
at 70-71. Rubin posited a model of precedent where the value of precedents does not decline over
time. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 53-56. Landes & Posner depreciated precedents, but their model is
too general on this point to note the implications. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 262-63. The
depreciation of precedents will speed or hinder any trend toward efficiency or inefficiency in a model
of the development of the common law, but depreciation is not necessary to the trend itself. See app.
(proof 1) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
The production and depreciation of precedents is discussed in Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (depreciation rate of 4% to 5% per
year found for federal appellate precedents).
73. This component is the product of d, a constant of depreciation, and fx(r), the previous distri-
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bution of rules resulting from litigating, overturning, and revising old
rules during the preceding period;"' and (3) the distribution of rules from
the preceding period that are litigated and upheld."5 Each of these compo-
nents can be analyzed separately.
The first term, depreciated precedents from the preceding period, exerts
a strong stabilizing effect -on the law."0 If few new cases are generated
each period, law at time t+1 will be much like law at time t.
The second term, measuring the distribution of rules which are over-
turned and revised, can have either of two consequences. First, if over-
turned rules are revised to conform with the distribution in terms of effi-
ciency of precedents at time t, this term moderates the velocity of change
in the recklessness of the common law."' The revised rules at time t+1
mirror the rules at time t. Second, if the judiciary favors reckless or non-
reckless rules in the distribution of precedents, then this term will reflect
the judiciary's preference."'
The third term, which measures rules that are litigated and upheld,
will tend to shift the distribution toward recklessness. Reckless rules are
litigated more often and will accumulate precedent stock."9 There is a
snowball effect. The more cases that arise in each period, the more this
term will dominate depreciated cases from previous periods. The result is
a trend toward reckless common law, which will be neutralized only by
an offsetting judicial bias toward non-reckless rules.
Under the assumptions of the model-that accident costs are amenable
to economic analysis and decisions by courts are largely based on previous
judicial decisions-reckless rules will be favored more and more by the
mechanism of precedent.80 This result is not necessarily invalidated by a
bution of precedents. See app. (on file with Yale Law Journal).
74. This component is denoted fw(r). It is a distribution potentially different from f (r). It is
weighted by (1-a), where a is the proportion of rules overturned. See app. (on file with Ya/e Law
Journal).
75. This component is the product of the distribution of precedent at the previous period weighted
by h(r), the amount of litigation at any level of recklessness, and a, the proportion of rules overturned.
See app. (on file with Yale Law Journal).
76. An assumption of this model, and an implicit assumption in the models of Rubin and Landes
& Posner, is that precedent behaves similarly for rules of different degrees of recklessness. This is the
most parsimonious assumption about the interaction of precedent and efficiency, and it finds some
support in the inability of many courts to distinguish the efficiency of rules. See infra note 89. Judges'
bias toward efficiency aspects of precedent is subsumable into the model. See infra note 86.
77. See app. (proof 1) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
78. See app. (proof 2) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
79. Reckless, efficient, and non-reckless rules are upheld (and overturned) at the same rate in this
model. The domination of reckless rules arises from the accumulation of reckless precedents because of
intense litigation. See app. (on file with Yale Law Journal).
80. This model and other models of precedent, such as that of Landes & Posner, assume that a
court determines that a litigated accident unambiguously falls under a certain rule of common law.
The point has been made that a court is usually faced with competing lines of decision, which it must
synthesize in rendering a decision. See Priest, supra note 58, at 403-07. However, this complication
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more complex causal mechanism for judicial decision. It is the product of
a legal system where many factors-including the stock of precedents in
the activity under examination-account for the decision in a case.8 '
C. The Dominance of Reckless Rules
As a consequence of the accumulation of a large stock of reckless prece-
dent, 2 reckless law will be the standard for evaluating accident rules.
Reckless precedents will tend to be relatively sophisticated and compre-
hensive since they are so often litigated and considered.8 3 The more exten-
sive litigation of reckless rules will also tend to make this law more inter-
nally consistent.8 ' Therefore, as new areas of law arise, courts and
commentators will look to reckless areas of law for models. Precedent
favoring reckless rules will tend to overshadow precedent favoring non-
reckless rules, and non-reckless areas of law will be synthesized into the
common law to comply with the reckless standard. 8
does not undermine a model of precedent, which contemplates that the distribution of precedents at
any time t is a function of the previous distribution as weighted by the amount of litigation under-
taken. The process is driven by the disproportionate litigation of rules that cause more accidents and
more serious accidents. All that is necessary to the results of a model of precedent is that the rule
relied on by parties in producing accident prevention is the same rule litigated in court. See app. (on
file with Yale Law Journal).
This result holds regardless of the initial distribution of precedents. An initial distribution of prece-
dents that favored less reckless rules will simply take longer to move to any degree of recklessness than
would an initial distribution favoring more reckless rules. See app. (on file with Yale Law Journal).
81. Many causal mechanisms for judicial decision besides the stock of precedent favoring a rule
have been identified. These factors are not considered in this Note because they are unlikely to have a
systematic effect in terms of efficiency on the distribution of precedents. Some judges may favor certain
classes of litigants, and base some percentage of their decisions on this consideration. Because this
dimension of decisionmaking is independent of efficiency, if the remainder of their decisions are based
on precedent, the findings of this Note hold. The non-precedential causal mechanism simply reduces
the speed of the trend toward recklessness.
One factor that may influence decisions of judges is the relative wealth of parties. This is likely to
have a systematic effect on efficiency and is considered infra p. 885.
This Note offers an "invisible hand" explanation for the development of inefficiency in the common
law; it does not rely on the wisdom or attitudes of judges, but merely on the systematic behavior of
litigants. For an approach to common law evolution relying on judicial insight, see Cooter, Korn-
hauser & Lane, supra note 2 (demonstrating that courts can determine efficient standards of care with
limited information if legal precedent can be revised by judges in light of experience).
82. This model assumes that precedents are on the average of equal weight. This is certainly
untrue, but it is also a harmless reduction of reality, since the model is only concerned with the
aggregate effect of precedents. It seems safe to assume that important and unimportant precedents are
distributed randomly along the continuum of reckless rules; such a distribution would cause no sys-
tematic bias in the model. Other models have made a similar implicit assumption about precedents.
See Rubin, supra note 2, at 53-56; Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 264.
83. On the development of new areas of common law and the evolution of influential legal
thought, see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Howe ed. 1968); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA (1980).
84. Internal consistency is likely to prove attractive to courts and commentators concerned with
legal formality. This possibility is considered by Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 283 & n.103.
85. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 129-30 (analysis of conditions under which anachronistic
law is revised).
William Landes and Richard Posner have proposed that a principle of consistency exists in the
common law such that the variance in terms of efficiency of rules in an area of law is reduced
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The tendency of reckless rules to squeeze out efficient or non-reckless
rules is present even when judicial attitudes toward recklessness are unfa-
vorable. Judicial bias against certain rules can take two forms: the propor-
tion of rules upheld can vary, either directly or inversely, with the reck-
lessness of rules; or overturned rules can be revised to a standard favoring
a certain distribution. 6 Both types of judicial bias," if sufficiently strong,
can eventually counteract the trend to recklessness.8" It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the judiciary is sufficiently conscious of efficiency to be biased
strongly in favor of any type of rule.8 9
George Priest has argued that the parties to a dispute, not the judge,
discern the efficiency of an area of law and cease bringing suit if an area
is clearly dominated by a standard 0 For example, if the common law
were dominated by reckless rules, disputants on the losing (non-reckless)
side of a rule would settle rather than litigate. Only issues where the out-
come is ambiguous would continue to go to trial. There are two difficulties
with this argument. First, if Priest is correct that parties selectively settle
disputes, his model will not result in greater litigation of any particular
type of rule, but rather in litigation of rules of uncertain application, a
over time. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 282-84. If this trend toward consistency is a result
of the litigation of rules, then it will speed the development of reckless rules, since reckless, oft-
litigated areas of law will become consistent faster than non-reckless, less litigated areas of law.
86. The two types of judicial bias have different consequences for the economic model of the
common law. The first type of bias is modelled by substituting a function A(r) for the constant a in
the proof developed in the appendix. See supra note 74; app. (on file with Yale Law Journal). This
function would measure the extent .to which judges favor rules of certain degrees of recklessness. This
type of bias could speed the trend toward recklessness, or reverse it entirely.
The second type of bias entails that the distribution of revised rules is shaped by judges' attitudes
toward degrees of recklessness. This would require a modification of the term fw(r) in the proofs in
the appendix to take account of judicial preference. See supra note 74; app. (proof 2) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). A judicial bias against reckless rules can still result in a trend toward reckless-
ness, although the process is slowed.
87. Priest discusses judicial bias in his model only in terms of the first type of bias. In Priest's
model, there are only two classes of rules: efficient and inefficient. When an inefficient rule is over-
turned, the rule that replaces it is necessarily efficient, and vice versa. See Priest, supra note 2.
88. Of course, if judges favor more reckless rules, the trend toward a predominantly reckless
common law is accelerated.
89. Egregious examples of inefficiency are probably disfavored by the judiciary. Justice Cardozo's
analysis of the Pokora rule, see supra note 40, furnishes an example. But sometimes even outrageously
inefficient rules are treated without reference to their economic consequence. In Andrew v. White
Line Bus Corp., 115 Conn. 464, 161 A. 792 (1932), the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld an
interpretation of a state statute that required motor vehicles to stay to the right of a street's median
when turning left. Failure to do so was negligence per se, although adherence to the rule was impossi-
ble for a bus making forward progress. The rule (although not common law) was obviously
inefficient.
It is probably fair to say that within very broad limits, judges do not consider the economic effi-
ciency of a rule in its adjudication. Priest argues, in fact, that the capacity of parties to settle or litigate
a dispute makes difficult the extraction of any systematic basis for common law decision. Specifically,
Priest contends, uncertainty associated with the outcomes of disputes will neutralize or disguise any
efficiency-generating mechanism (either based on precedent or judicial attitudes) in the common law.
See Priest, supra note 58, at 409-15.
90. Priest, supra note 58.
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factor that is independent of the rule's recklessness. Reckless rules would
still be litigated more often than non-reckless rules; the uncertainty of
rules would form an independent dimension of analysis. Second, the oper-
ation of this selective effect assumes that information on the mean effi-
ciency of the common law is available to every disputant.91 This is un-
likely, especially for disputants with small future stakes and little interest
in precedent.
This Note's model of the evolution of common law liability rules
predicts a trend to a certain type of economic inefficiency. It stands in
sharp contrast to previous models that have sought to generate efficient
rules from the common law process.
IV. Implications of the Model
This model of the development of the common law indicates that liabil-
ity rules will increase in recklessness over time. This result lends theoreti-
cal support to the empirical finding of some scholars that a statutory tort
system favoring victims has replaced a common law tort system favoring
injurers. It also suggests the need to reevaluate the efficiency literature,
which has found across-the-board efficiencies in common law adjudication.
Moreover, this model of judicial decisionmaking challenges conventional
economic views of the comparative efficiency-generating capacity of courts
and legislatures.
A. The Inefficient Common Law
Judicial decisionmaking in the formative period of Anglo-American
common law was structured to accommodate the interests of emerging in-
dustry.9 2 Most injurers were industries that attempted to externalize their
costs. Usually these costs were borne by the general populace. The com-
mon law evolved doctrines to prevent victims from recovering industry-
created costs. Compensation for victims was often limited by the absence
91. Priest's assumption is much stronger than the assumption of this model that parties act in an
economically rational manner. Priest's argument requires that parties successfully predict case out-
come, in contrast to the assumption of this model that parties make a subjective estimate of the
probability of success that may or may not be correct.
92. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (1973) (corporate enterprise
shielded from liability by tort doctrines; by 19th century, doctrines partially undermined); M. HOR-
WITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 70-71 (1977) (industrial enterprises
granted tort immunity by 19th century common law); Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in
the History of the Common Law of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1970) (fault requirement for
recovery in tort cases in England expanded during 19th century due to industrialization). But see
Schwartz, supra note 29 (empirical analysis of California and New Hampshire cases indicates com-
mon law did not favor emerging industry in tort cases); Rubin, The Historical Development of the
Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981) (common law during industrializa-
tion increasingly imposed liability on injurers).
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of liability rules for particular activities, or by the presence of inefficiently
stringent negligence standards and inefficiently harsh contributory negli-
gence standards.9" The early common law principle of strict liability for
injuries had vanished and comparative fault rules were unknown. 4 The
prevalence of uncompensated externalized costs induced injurers to mini-
mize their private costs by underproducing accident prevention. From an
economic perspective, the common law was reckless in the heyday of in-
dustrialization in England and America, and has been becoming progres-
sively more so ever since.
Various reasons have been advanced to explain this phenomenon. Rich-
ard Posner has proposed that the subsidy to injurers was in fact economi-
cally efficient in that it encouraged the development of infant industry,
which itself conferred external benefits on society.9 Other analysts ex-
plained the subsidy as a product of the ideology of industrial English and
American societies.96
The analysis in this Note suggests that the phenomenon can be ex-
plained instead in terms of the mechanism of precedent and litigation.
The judiciary's reliance on past decisions in regulating economic behav-
ior-the common law method-necessarily favored rules that were often
litigated, even if those rules resulted in a non-optimal number of accidents
or level of accident damages. The common law was reckless, and tended to
grow more reckless over time because reckless rules were favored by the
judicial process.
Relaxing one of the assumptions made in Part III provides further sup-
port for this new explanation. One reason that reckless rules produce ex-
cessive litigation is because reckless rules lead to high-stake accidents,
which are often litigated.97 This result is partially dependent on the exis-
93. For an analysis of doctrines that allowed industry to externalize its costs through negligence
rules with inadequate standards of care and contributory negligence doctrines with excessive require-
ments of care, see Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 359
(1951) (the principle "of a consistent theory of liability based on fault was developed to confer on
industrial enterprise an immunity to liability for accidental harm to others"); Malone, The Formative
Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946) (doctrine of contributory negligence
advanced in U.S. in order to protect nascent industry from jury awards to victims of accidents); see
also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734-35, 441 P.2d 912, 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76-77 (1968)
(concept of "duty" intended to restrict standard of care required on part of injurer).
Costs were also externalized by industry when no basis of liability existed to permit recovery by
victims. This was the situation for an injury to land by an adjoining landowner where the cause was
"natural." See Fletcher v. Rylands, I L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.
1868).
94. See supra note 29.
95. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 181-85. Posner argues that almost all of the common law is
efficient. See sources cited supra note 1; c Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 25 (negligence
rule efficient). But ef. Landes & Posner, supra note 2 (rule imposing liability on cheapest cost avoider
efficient).
96. See M. HORWrrZ, supra note 92, at 63-108.
97. See supra note 61.
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tence of roughly symmetric stakes between injurers and victims.98 In fact,
the distribution of future stakes in early common law cases was quite
asymmetric. Injurers tended to be industrial companies with a large inter-
est in establishing favorable precedent; victims were workers or communi-
ties with no interest in precedent."9 Those parties who benefited from the
development of reckless rules had the capacity to spend more in litigation
than their opponents and thus were more likely to succeed in establishing
favorable precedent."' If the assumption of symmetry of future stakes is
loosened, then there will be a stronger trend toward recklessness in the
common law than under the assumption noted in Part III.201
B. The Rise of Statutory Law
The twentieth century has witnessed a blizzard of statutes. Law made
by legislatures has eclipsed law made by judges in almost every area. 02
The reasons advanced for this trend usually center on the complexity of
modern society and the comparative skill of legislatures and administrative
agencies in dealing with changing circumstances.1 03 The model in this
Note suggests that codification could be a reaction to the recklessness of
the common law. Legislatures concerned with efficiency may have re-
placed reckless common law with statute.'" It is significant that the major
change in tort law in recent years-the expansion of strict liability-has
98. The severity effect requires that parties have roughly symmetric future stakes. Current stakes
are simply accident damages and are always symmetric between parties.
99. See supra note 92. For an example in a specific area of law, see Brenner, Nuisance Law and
the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974) (by end of 19th century, injurers in nuisance
actions were large manufacturers, victims were individuals). There is evidence that victims still have
less incentive to establish precedent. See Galanter, supra note 65.
100. The assumption that litigation expenditures will influence the decision of a court is admit-
tedly outside the scope of the model in this Note. It is nonetheless plausible and has been considered
in another model of the evolution of the common law. See Goodman, supra note 2.
101. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 273-74, 279-80 (asymmetric stakes cause "inefficient
legal rules to become even more inefficient"; but result discounted); Rubin, supra note 2, at 56 (there
is "no tendency to efficiency" with asymmetric stakes).
Loosening the assumption of symmetric stakes has two effects. First, asymmetric stakes increase
potential gain to one of the parties but not to the other. This will speed the trend toward recklessness
by causing enhanced litigation of reckless rules. Formally, dh(r)/dr increases. Second, reckless rules
will tend to be upheld proportionately more often than non-reckless rules because injurers, who tend
to support reckless rules, will triumph in litigation. Formally, the constant a in the proof in the
appendix is replaced with a function A(r) that favors litigation of reckless rules. This effect speeds the
trend toward recklessness in the common law. See supra note 86 (judicial bias modelled in similar
manner).
102. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 1-7; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 92, at 99-100; M. HOR-
WITZ, supra note 92, at 1-4.
103. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 72-80.
104. R. Peter Terrebonne came to the opposite conclusion about the interaction of statutes and
common law. He argued that inefficient statutes will stifle the efficiency-generating features of the
common law. See Terrebonne, supra note 2, at 405. George Priest contended that his explanation of
an efficiency-generating mechanism in the common law also applies to the interpretation of statutes.
Priest, supra note 2, at 65.
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been by way of the Restatement and statute.1"5 The most important cur-
rent development in tort law-the shift to comparative fault-is primarily
statutory.10 Both of these advances diminish the recklessness of accident
law.
Law made by legislatures has been criticized as the product of electoral
processes unconcerned with economic efficiency.107 Richard Posner has ar-
gued that legislatures do little else than redistribute wealth to politically
effective interest groups.108 These criticisms may have some validity. Cer-
tainly the representation of previously disenfranchised groups (often dis-
proportionately victims in liability situations) has had a corrective effect
on legislation. This trend is not inconsistent with the production of effi-
cient statutory law, however, since these interest groups can be expected to
ameliorate previous reckless, injurer-favoring common law.
Legislation may have moderated some of the inefficiencies in the com-
mon law of accidents, but there is no assurance that legislation will al-
ways be more efficient than common law. Statutes, however, will not suf-
fer from the trend toward recklessness inherent in judge-made law. In the
absence of economic data, a presumption of efficiency should attach to
statutes over common law. This Note's analysis of the relative institu-
tional competence of courts and legislatures runs counter to the recom-
mendations of many commentators on the economic development of the
common law. 09 Courts have been looked to as the upholders of efficiency
(often in the guise of justice11 0) over other values, and legislatures have
105. See supra note 29. A rule of strict liability will by itself usually be reckless, but given a
comparative advantage by the injurer over the victim in producing accident prevention, it will be less
so than a reckless rule of no liability.
106. See supra note 23.
107. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 177-95 (criticizing collectivist, largely legislative
rulemaking as inconsistent with efficiency and economic and political freedom); F. HAYEK, LAW, LEG-
ISLATION AND LIBERTY 94-144 (1973) (criticizing legislation as inferior to common law on non-eco-
nomic grounds); Stiger, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971) (economic
theory of interest group bargaining in legislatures).
108. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 399-415.
109. See, e.g., id. at 404 (judge-made rules "tend to be efficiency promoting while those made by
legislatures tend to be efficiency reducing") (footnotes omitted); Rubin, supra note 2, at 61 (statutes
inefficient because similar to common law situation where parties have asymmetric stakes in litiga-
tion); Terrebonne, supra note 2, at 405 (inefficient legislation can create pressures to substitute legis-
lation for common law).
Paul Rubin has argued recently that what appears to be a distinction in terms of efficiency between
statute and cornhnon law is really a distinction between "law throughout the beginning of this century
and later law. That is, in the early period, most law was efficient and most law was common law. In
the later period, most law was inefficient and most law was statute law." Rubin, Common Law and
Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 207 (1982). Rubin's idea stands in contrast to the thesis of this
Note in that it suggests that law has become more inefficient over time. For Rubin, statutes cause
rather than ameliorate inefficiency in the legal system.
110. Richard Posner has argued convincingly that the preoccupation of courts with justice is often
a preoccupation with efficiency. Certainly the concepts of justice and efficiency overlap extensively. See
R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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been cast into the role of wealth redistributors unwilling to consider the
efficiency aspects of their actions. The theoretical underpinnings of these
views of judicial and legislative decisionmaking must be reexamined.
